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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060006-5

18 April 1968

BRIEFING NOTICE FOR:

1-D/OSR
1-PA/OSR
3-O/DOSR
1-OSR/Ch/RAD
1-C/EURA
1-PA/EURA
8-EURA/EE
2-EURA/Sov
2-EURA/WE
2-EURA/WE/FII
2-EURA/WE/NCE
1-C/MEAA
1-PA/MEAA
3-MEAA/GTI
3-MEAA/AR

INFO:

	25X1A	
2-O/DCI	[REDACTED]	25X1A
2-O/DDCI	[REDACTED]	
2-OLC	[REDACTED]	
2-OLC	[REDACTED]	25X1A
1-DDI		
1-ADDI		
1-0/DDI	[REDACTED]	25X1A
1-DOCI		
1-SDO		
1-OBGI	[REDACTED] 3G00	25X1A

Balance: OCI/S/Pres

1. Attached is outline of proposed DCI briefing of Hardy Subcommittee (House Armed Services) ooa 30 April.

2. Contributions are required in Presentation Staff, OCI, by close of business Tuesday, 23 April.

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BRIEFING NOTICE

1. DCI is tentatively scheduled to testify for two hours, on or about 30 April, before the special Hardy Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on possible threats to the U.S., possible involvement of U.S. force, or possible invocation of U.S. commitments, in the areas generally described as "Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, Near East, Middle East, and Scandinavia."

2. Chairman Rivers established the Hardy Subcom last fall, under Rep. Porter Hardy of Virginia, to conduct "a full and thorough inquiry into...the status of plans, including contingency plans, for achieving a military victory in SEA, the ability of our armed forces to simultaneously meet present commitments in SEA, as well as treaty obligations, including the availability of military equipment and present and projected force levels."

3. On 9 October DCI briefed the Hardy Subcom on Communist China, North and South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, North and South Korea, Japan, Nationalist China, Indonesia, Hong Kong and British presence, Burma, and India.

4. The scope of the inquiry has now been greatly extended geographically by the rationale that the extent of U.S. commitment in Vietnam has a direct impact on and interreaction with U.S. commitments and interests on a global basis. Accordingly the Hardy Subcom has asked for the same type of briefing DCI gave them on SEA, to cover EE, Spain, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, Arab-Israeli, Iran, and Scandinavia. A detailed outline is attached. It may be expanded after Legislative Counsel has checked it out with the subcommittee staff early next week.

5. DCI's terms of reference, of course, will be foreign--not U.S.--capabilities, intentions, objectives, etc., establishing a background for the Hardy Subcom inquiry into U.S. policies, commitments, capabilities which will subsequently be addressed primarily to DOD and State. His line of approach, depending on the country involved, will be the possibilities of U.S. involvement, or the potential enemy threat in the event of U.S. involvement---i.e., mainly the flap potential country by country, strengths, and any U.S. base problems.

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Content and Mechanics:

6. Classification is limited to TOP SECRET---but the "fortified Top Secret"--as in the NIE's, make use of Codeword and other sensitive info as long as you don't specify details and facts which obviously could have come only from such sensitive sources and methods.

7. This briefing is not a primer, but a sitrep and prospects roundup at a fairly high level of sophistication. All but two of the Hardy Subcom members are also members of the Armed Services (Rivers) CIA Subcommittee, and Chairman Rivers and the ranking minority member, Representative Bates, will be sitting in as ex officio members.

8. Timing, etc. Contributions must reach Presentation Staff by close of business Tuesday, 23 April, to permit processing a book of this size (120 to 140 pages) in time to submit to DCI for review at oob Friday; Revisions and updates can be made over the 27/28 April week-end, and the exact date of briefing is still open.

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Red 9380
Grey 8358
Tube BZ-4

Porty Hardy, jr., Chairman
Charles A. Halleck F. Edward Hébert
Samuel S. Stratton
William H. Bates, ex officio Chairman Rivers, ex officio
William Dickinson

Staff:
Reddan, John T., Counsel
Martineau, David L.
Garcia, Lebre R.

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Draft Outline, DCI Briefing for Hardy Subcommittee

[Where there is a suggested time, reference is in minutes. One minute is approximately one page, double-spaced, in our standard NSC briefing format with hanging indents and good margins (50-character line.)]

S/PRES

I. Intro and terms of reference (S/Pres drafting) [2:00]

II. Eastern Europe:

A. The Warsaw Pact-- Usefulness, cohesion, problems, reliability. [3:00]

1. Political status of EE--what ever happened to the monolith, or Whither Rumania/Czecho, etc. [3:00]

2. Military capability of Warsaw Pact in general terms---you'll have to get into strengths of individual countries below. This would be good place, however, for statement of general reliability, readiness, usefulness of EE mil forces. Level with this audience on status of Order of Battle re-study, if pertinent. [2:30]

B. Country run-down: for each country listed, 1:00 to 1:30 each from EURA/EE on political situation, and same amount from OSR on military posture. [15-20:00 total]

1. Poland
2. East Germany
3. Czechoslovakia
4. Hungary
5. Rumania
6. Bulgaria.

C. Yugoslavia, ditto, but including Tito's Third Force efforts, succession problem [4:00]

D. Albania---because it's there. [2:00]

III. Spain--Spanish ~~relations with~~ U.S., attitude on bases, political/economic stability, briefly mil strength, rels to NATO, other Medit. countries; Need a minute or so on status and prospects Gibraltar dispute with U.K. [4:00-6:00]

IV. Portugal--bilaterals with US, principally, with regard bases, mil aid, respect for MAP restrictions. Briefly, rels with NATO, UN, and Portugal's African problems. Mil Strength. [4:00]

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[10-15:00]

V. SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN PRESENCE

OSR

A. History, present status, analysis of capabilities and threat.

EURASIA/Sov
Forn Pol,
levying on MEA
as necessary

B. Soviet objectives--cf Fulbright^{briefing} intro---Relationship with Arab-Israeli. Will Soviets need, want, get bases? Specifically cover Mers-el-Kebir; I can't recall a committee recently that hasn't asked about this specifically or possible bases in Western Med in general terms.

C. The airlifts (Arab and Yemen) in general terms---leave specifics for Arab-Israeli section below, but cover impact v. effectiveness (i.e., couple of ships at most could have accomplished as much as Yemeni lift.)

D. Are Sovs nibbling at PROSY, East African bases/presence?

VI. As ^{intro} ~~xxxx~~ for GTI specifics, Soviet overtures to Turkey, Iran, Cyprus [3:00]

VII. Greece---Internal sit, rels with NATO, rels with Turkey, attitude on Cyprus, rels with U.S. mil strength, mil effectiveness. [4:00]

VIII. Turkey---Attitude on Cyprus, attitude toward U.S., toward Greece, toward NATO, mil strength and readiness with specific ref to possibility of Cyprus intervention and effect on NATO-committed forces. Stickiness on bilaterals. U.S. bases, forces, presence. Internal situation. Rel with Soviets, with Israelis and Arabs, toward CENTO. [6:00]

IX. Cyprus---temperature reading and intentions/capabilities/machinations of Makarios. Strength and effectiveness of UN forces, other forces. Status of Commies. [3-4:00]

X. Iran---Shah's rels with US, with CENTO, with USSR, [3-4:00] fear of Arabs, Persian Gulf problems, internal stability, mil strength; consortium problem briefly. [10-12:00]

XI. Arab-Israeli Situation: non-status of negotiations. ~~xxxx~~ Border tensions. Israeli intentions, problems, reactions to Fatah and attitude toward Husayn. Mil equipment rels with France, U.S., others. Mil. strength and our estimate of capabilities in event of another round. Arabs---extent and effectiveness of Sov.re-supply. Cohesion and lack of it. Nasir's external and internal problems. Brief sitrep Syria, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya (Wheelus) Yemen, PROSY

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XII. Scandinavia

[12:00]

- U R A
VE/NCE
- A. Denmark and Norway: Rels with NATO, bilaterally with U.S. Degree of threat, if any, internal and external. Mil strength, possible demands on, or expectations from, U.S. Cover Greenland, Spitzbergen, any overflight and other air problems.
 - B. Sweden: Policies and attitudes. Mil strength. Any flap potential.
 - C. Iceland. Rels with U.S., with NATO, problems.

ENVOI: The foregoing is a suggested outline. Contributors please feel free to crank in anything you feel is germane to field of inquiry which I may have omitted, but conversely, where outline includes something you feel is marginal, at least include negative statement.

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